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"GOOD MORAL CHARACTER" IN THE
NATURALIZATION LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES
ELMER PLISCHKE

N THE United States an alien must meet various prescribed qualifications and perform certain positive acts before he can become a
naturalized citizen. The procedural steps which such an alien must
observe include the obtaining of a certificate of lawful entry into the
United States for permanent residence, the making of a declaration of
intention to become a United States' citizen, petitioning for such citizenship, and presenting himself for a final hearing in open court.
Among the negative qualifications which must be met by the alien
are the following: He must renounce his former allegiance, he must
prove that he is not a polygamist, he must satisfactorily show that he
has no anarchistic ambitions or adherence, and he must expressly
renounce any order or title of nobility.
There are also various positive qualifications, including, among
others: Five years' continuous residence in the United States and
six months' residence in the county in which the petition is filed, immediately preceding such filing; residence in the United States from the
time the petition is made to the time of admission to citizenship by
naturalization; and during such periods, attachment to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States, a favorable disposition to the
good order and happiness of the United States, and good moral character.
For an understanding of the naturalization laws one must also have
an understanding of what constitutes "good moral character." This
is, however, easier said than done, for the courts have never attempted
a complete, comprehensive definition of this term.
Almost everyone has his own idea as to what constitutes "good
moral character," and these concepts differ widely. This is understandable, for many people, rightly or wrongly, consider morality to be a
purely subjective phenomenon. As a consequence, we find jurists also
frequently contradicting each other in their interpretations of moral
character within the meaning of the law. The point of differing juridical opinions is aptly, though briefly, presented in a study entitled Conflicts in NaturalizationDecisions,"which was written under the direction of Harold Fields, who is chairman of the Committee on Judicial
2The study was published by the National Council on Naturalization and Citi-

zenship, N. Y. 1936; reprinted from (1936) 10 Temp. L. Q. No. 3.
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Decisions of the Naturalization Cases for the National Council on
Naturalization and Citizenship, and executive director of the National
League for American Citizenship of New York City.
Perhaps the best method of determining the legal meaning of "good
moral character" is to review the various Federal and State court
decisions rendered in cases which have involved such interpretation.
Unfortunately a negative approach must be taken, determining what
does not constitute "good moral character," rather than what does.
However, both the positive and the negative aspects of the interpretation will be briefly considered.
On the positive side, in discussing the interpretation of that portion
of the law which states that the alien, for a period of five years preceding the filing of his application for naturalization must have "behaved as a person of good moral character," District Judge Quarles
of the United States District Court for Wisconsin declared: "

. .

. A

good moral character-is one that measures up as good among the people
of the community in which the party lives; that is, up to the standard
of the average citizen ... So here, where the law says a good moral

character, it means such a reputation as will pass muster with the
average man. It need not rise above the level of the common mass of
people." 2 But not all judges are of the same opinion, as is shown below.
In United States v. Hrasky,3 Judge Moyers making a clear distinction between "character" and "reputation" held " ...

While the word

'character' is frequently used as synonymous with 'reputation,' strictly
speaking, character is what a person is, while reputation is what he is
supposed to be... 'Character consists of the qualities which constitute
the individual; reputation the sum of opinions entertained concerning
him..

In analyzing the nature of moral character, a distinction has been
noted between acts evil in themselves malum in se and offenses that are
merely law violations because they are prohibited malum prohibitum.4
Another aspect of the positive definition of "good moral character"
to be considered is that moral character must be such as to result in
worthy and beneficial citizenship. Circuit Judge Moorman, makes this
point by saying: " ... The aim of this statute is to admit to citizenship
only those aliens who will make worthy citizens ....
Again, it has

been held that the character of the applicant is considered with refer2 In re Hopp, 179 Fed. 561, 562-3 (E.D. Wis. 1910).
a240
Ill.
560, 88 N.E. 1031 (1909).
4
In re Spenser, 5 Sawyer 195, 22 Fed. Cas. 921, Federal Case No. 13234 (C.C.
Ore. 1878); In re Trum, 199 Fed. 361 (W.D. Mo. 1912).

5 In re Nybo, 42 F. (2d) 727, 728 (C.C.A. 6th Mich. 1930).
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ence to the probability of his citizenship resulting beneficially to the
government, or "the nation and its present membership,... 7
Furthermore, American citizenship and the procedure of naturalization are privileges rather than rights. District Judge Tuttle made this
point very clear when he stated: "Citizenship is not a matter of right
enjoyed by an alien, but is a reward given.., to those aliens who are
satisfactorily equipped and inclined mentally, and who, by consistent
and continuous right living and obedience to law during the prescribed
period prior to their admission, are found to be worthy of the high
reward of citizenship... "8 Again, in Turlel v. United States District
Judge Reeves maintained that naturalization proceedings "are not for.
the usual purpose of vindicating an existing right, but for the purpose
of getting granted to an alien rights that do not yet exist..."
As a consequence it would seem to follow that it is the duty of
the petitioner to prove his moral character and the fact that he has
not violated the law. District Judge Henning declared that " . .. the
burden is upon the petitioner for naturalization to establish by competent proof that he has fully met the requirements of the statute... ,,"1
However, the petitioner's testimony is not sufficient proof of such character2 ' More definite proof is necessary. Therefore the petitioner's
statements as well as those of the witnesses are made under oath. The
Field Inspectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service also
investigate the past lives of the petitioners.
On the negative side of the definition of "good moral character" it
has generally been held that criminality renders an alien unworthy of
American citizenship. The difficulty lies in the fact that few judges,
even in naturalization proceedings, agree as to what constitutes criminality. For example, on the one hand District Judge Deady claims that
" ... whatever is forbidden by the law of the land ought to be considered... immoral, within the purview of this statute ... "12 while
other judges have held that citizenship by naturalization should be
denied only if aliens violate the important laws of the state or nation." But which are these more important laws? The following para6

inre McNeil, 14 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Cal. 1936).

7In re Caroni, 13 F. (2d) 954 (N.D. Cal. 1926) ; see also Petition of Oganesoff,

20 F. (2d) 978 (S.D. Cal., 1927); Estrin v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 105
(C.C.A. 2d 1935); United States v. Gerstein, 284 Ill. 174, 119 N.E. 922,
1 A.L.R. 318 (1918); In re Nosen, 49 F. (2d) 817 (D. Wash. 1931).
8
Petition of Nybo, 34 F. (2d) 161, 162 (E.D. Mich. 1929).
o31 F. (2d) 696, 698 (C.C.A. 8th Wyo. 1929).
ao Petition of Oganesoff, 20 F. (2d) 978, 980 (S.D. Cal. 1926; also United States
v. Etheridge, 41 F. (2d) 762 (D.Ore. 1930); In re McNeil, 14 F. Supp. 394
(N.D. Cal., 1936).
I' n re Bodek, 63 Fed. 813 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1894).
In re Spenser, 5 Sawyer 195, 22 Fed. Cas. 921, Federal Case No. 13,234 (C.C.
Ore. 1878).
= United States v. Turlej, 18 F. (2d) 435 (D.Wyo. 1927).
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graphs will give some indication as to the offenses which have been
considered serious enough to bar an alien from naturalization in the
past.
In several cases citizenship has been denied to persons who had
committed homicide. One such petitioner was convicted of manslaughter in 1912 and was paroled in 1915.14 Similarly, naturalization
was denied a petitioner who had pleaded guilty to a charge of murder
in the second degree and had served nine years at hard labor, although
the petitioner had maintained good behavier during the five years immediately preceding his petition, as the whole character of the applicant
must be taken into consideration."
Petitioner McNeil had his petition for citizenship dismissed because
he pleaded guilty to a charge of felonious embezzlement, although he
had been sentenced and later paroled and pardoned. In this case District Judge St. Sure maintained that pardoning, though it removed
legal guilt, did not alter the character of the petitioner.,
Non-support of one's minor children, whether they reside in the
United States with the petitioner or not, constitutes sufficient reason
for denial. 1 Bribing or attempting to bribe government officials, particularly those concerned in the naturalization proceedings, is also sufficient to render the alien unworthy.' 8
Another offense which is of such severity as to warrant denial is
perjury? 9 Perjury may be committed either in the naturalization pro20
ceedings or in other legal proceedings. In the case of In re Ta.larico,
the petitioner gave a false reply when asked if he had ever been
arrested. Another alien had his certificate of naturalization cancelled on
the grounds of perjury regarding his age.' A petition was likewise
denied for the misstatement by a petitioner of her name and marital
status. Having been married the day before her departure for the
United States, and having her passport and visa made out in her
maiden name, she sought to preserve herself from the discomfort of
explaining her change in name, and therefore used her maiden name
in her certificate of arrival and declaration of intention F2 Again, in
1 In re Caroni, 13 F. (2d) 954, 955 (N.D. Cal. 1926).
16 In re Ross, 188 Fed. 685 (C.C. M.D. Pa. 1911).
1s In re McNeil, 14 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Cal. 1936) ; see In re Spenser, 5 Sawyer
195, 22 Fed. Cas. 921, Federal Case No. 13,234 (C.C. Ore. 1878). On the other
hand, the United States Supreme Court, in the Garland Case, 4 Wall. 333
(1866) held that a pardon removed the guilt as well as the legal consequences
of a law violation.
- It re Nosen, 49 F. (2d) 817 (D. Wash. 1931).
3APetition of Oganesoff, 20 F. (2d) 978 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
1
In re Spenser, 5 Sawyer 195, 22 Fed. Cas. 921, Federal Case No. 13,234 (C.C.
Ore. .1878).
- 197 Fed. 1019 (W.D. Pa. 1912).
In re Guliano, 156 Fed. 420 (S.D. N.Y. 1907).
- In re Zycholc, 43 F. (2d) 438 (E.D. Mich. 1930).
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United States v. Etheridge,3 the denial was based upon the grounds of
a fraudulent misstatement of the petitioner's name and date of entry.
The petitioner, however, had also concealed a conviction for forgery
committed in England, and had been convicted in New Jersey for
obtaining money under false pretenses. On the other hand, citizenship
4 despite the fact that the
was granted the petitioner in In re Camaras,2
petitioner had given a wrong name for one of his daughters and had
misstated her place of residence, on the grounds that the petitioner had
not attempted to conceal the parentage or identity of the daughter.
There were also several cases in which citizenship by naturalization was denied aliens because of violations of the National Prohibition Act and the liquor laws. The Bonner Case2 showed that the
maintenance of a common nuisance in which intoxicating liquors were
unlawfully kept and sold was a sufficient reason. Other decisions show
that not only the illegal possession of intoxicating liquor during the
statutory period-despite the fact that it was claimed to be for personal use-was sufficient to result in denial,26 but also the illegal manufacture of liquor during the five year period,2 the sale of liquor in
violation of an injunction, and the illegal possession of a still, although
no liquor was successfully manufactured.1 In the cases of United
States v. Mirsky3 0 and United States v. TurlepJ certificates of naturalization were cancelled because of liquor violations that had occurred
prior to the granting of the certificates. In the latter case the cancellation was based upon one violation shortly before naturalization and
three violations thereafter. Furthermore, in United States v. Turlej,2
which was an appeal case brought by the alien, District Judge Reeves
reaffirmed the cancellation of the certificate of the alien. A petition for
naturalization was also denied in the case of an alien who operated a
tavern in a Mexican city immediately across the border, at least partially for the purpose of serving liquor to visiting Americans during
the Prohibition era. When the alien moved to the United States and
applied for citizenship, he was denied for that reason.
Opinion seems to be divided on the question of obeying unenforced
Sunday closing laws. In United States v. HraskyM and United States v.
2341

F. (2d) 762 (D.Ore. 1930).

24202 Fed. 1019 (D. R.I. 1913).
2-279 Fed. 789 (D. Mont. 1922).
2In re Raio, 3 F. (2d) 78 (S.D. Tex. 1924).
27t;
re Nagy, 3 F. (2d) 77 (S.D. Tex. 1924).

28 In re Trum, 199 Fed. 361 (W.D. Mo. 1912).
nlin re Phillips, 3 F. (2d) 79 (S.D. Tex. 1924).
o17 F. (2d) 275 (S.D. N.Y., 1926).
3118 F. (2d) 435 (D. Wyo. 1927).

32Turlej v. United States, 31 F. (2d) 696 (C.C.A. 8th 1929).
Ex parte Elson, 299 Fed. 352 (W.D. Tex. 1924).

ad 240 Ill.
560, 88 N.E. 1031 (1909).
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Gerstein.e cases, both of which .are appeal cases arising in the State
courts of Illinois, certificates of citizenship were cancelled. In the former, the petitioner had known of the Sunday closing law for two years
but had kept his back door open for his patrons, and he declared that
he would continue to do so despite the oath he would have to take to
support the Constitution and the laws of the country. In the Gerstein
case the petitioner had kept his saloon open on Sundays until three
months before the filing of his petition, when it was made known that
the closing law would be enforced. On the other hand, however, just
the reverse was held by District Judge Quarles in the case of In re
Hopp.3 Since the Sunday closing law had never been enforced by
either the state or the county, a certificate was granted.
In the case of In re Spiegel3 7 the alien's petition was denied on the
grounds of bigamy. The petitioner came to the United States, leaving
his wife in Poland. Later they were divorced by a New York City
rabbi, and the divorce was recognized in Poland. The petitioner thereupon remarried, but his petition for citizenship was denied because of
bigamy, the New York courts recognizing divorce only when granted
by due judicial proceedure. Adultery has usually been held to render
one incompetent for citizenship.3 8 The same is true of petitioners guilty
of conducting or being associated with immoral houses.3
It is quite apparent why aliens who violate the immigration and
naturalization laws of the United States have been denied citizenship
by naturalization."0 Similar denials take place in naturalization cases
involving aliens guilty of violating the citizenship laws.42
Perhaps particularly interesting is the denial of naturalization in
In re Gnadt2 based upon desertion from the United States Army followed by court martial and a sentence of one year at hard labor, for
this case not only indicates what does not constitute "good moral character," but it also brings to our attention the legal fact that desertion
from the armed forces of the United States results in the loss of citi284 Ill. 174, 119 N.E. 922, A.L.R. 318 (1918).
179 Fed. 561 (E.D. Wis. 1910).
3 24 F. (2d) 605 (S.D. N.Y. 1928) ; for an identical case see Petition of Horowitz, 48 F. (2d) 652 (E.D. N.Y. 1931).
8
Nickovich v. Mollart, 51 Nev. 306, 274 Pac. 809 (1929); United States v.
Unger, 26 F. (2d) 114 (S.D. N.Y. 1928); United States v. Wexler, 8 F.
(2d) 880 (E.D. N.Y. 1925).
8
In re Kornstein, 268 Fed. 172 (E.D. Mo. 1920); United States v. Leles, 236
Fed. 784 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
-0 Petition of Nybo, 34 F. (2d) 161 (E.D. Mich. 1929) ; denial reaffirmed in In re
Nybo, 42 F. (2d) 727 (C.C.A. 6th Mich. 1930). See United States v. Clifford,
89 F. (2d) 184 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937).
-1 In re Centi, 211 Fed. 559 (W.D. Tenn. 1914) ; In re Di Clerico, 158 Fed. 905
(E.D. N.Y. 1908);
269 Fed. 189 (E.D. Mo. 1920).
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zenship to nationals and forever bars one from becoming a citizen of
the United States.'3
It is also important to note that "good moral character" must not
only be maintained during the statutory five-year period, according to
Judge Bourquin of the United States District Court of Montana, but
also during the interval between the filing of the petition for citizenship
and the final court hearing." In a few cases it has also been held that
the conduct of the alien prior to the five-year period immediately preceding the filing of his petition must also be taken into consideration.'3
The following are some of the more important conclusions which
can be drawn from the foregoing paragraphs in arriving at a working
definition of "good moral character" :.46
1. Citizenship is a privilege, and therefore the procedure by which
it is obtained by aliens, namely, naturalization, is also a privilege.' 7
They are not rights, and they are subject to the law.
2. Citizenship and naturalization are not open to criminals.
Habitual violators of the lav are customarily denied citizenship for
obvious reasons. A distinction is made between perpetrators of violations of the law that are malum in se and those which are malum prohibitum. The former usually immediately and automatically disqualify
the petitioner from naturalization. As to the latter the courts are
divided. However, in the cases which have been cited in the preceding
paragraphs, it has been noted that the following crimes have been considered sufficient to result in denial: homicide, non-support, bribery,
perjury, embezzlement, violations of the National Prohibition Act and
the liquor laws, bigamy, adultery, owning or operating immoral houses,
violations of the immigration and naturalization laws, and desertion
from the armed forces.
3. The granting or the denial of a petition on the basis of "good
moral character" is founded upon character both of itself and in view
of its manifestations. But, since character is an internal reality, it is
easier and frequently necessary to base the granting or denial upon
behavior. Opinion seems to be divided, however, as to whether the
petitioner's behavior must be equal to or superior to the customary
standards of the community in which he resides.
-Act of Aug. 22, 1912, c. 336, § I; 37 Stat. 356; R.S. § 1998; 8 U.S.C. § II.
"In re Bonner, 279 Fed. 789 (D.Mont. 1922); see In re Nybo, 42 F. (2d) 727

(C.C.A. 6th, 1930)
188 Fed. 685 (C.C. M.D. Pa. 1911) ; Inre Spenser, 5 Sawyer 195,

mit re Ross,

22 Fed. Cas. 921, Federal Case No. 13,234 (C.C. Ore. 1878).
"All reported Federal and State court decisions dealing with the interpretation
of the "good moral character" provisions of the Naturalization Law have been
examined for this study.
47 The United States Supreme Court has held this same view in Johannessen v.
United States, 225 U.S. 227, 32 Sup. Ct 613, 56 L.ed. 1066 (1912); United
States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 Sup. Ct. 422, 61 L.ed. 853 (1917) ; United

States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 38 Sup. Ct. 118, 62 L.ed. 32 (1917).
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4. Admission to citizenship, it is commonly agreed, should be
granted only to those petitioners who would make worthy citizens and
who would be a benefit to the United States.
5. The burden of proof in establishing a petitioner's eligibility
for citizenship rests with the petitioner.
6. Good moral character must be proven not only during the five
years immediately preceding the filing of the petition but also during
the interval between the date of such filing and the final court hearing.
Opinion is divided as to wether the life and acts of the alien prior to
his coming to the United States, as well as to his period of residence
in the United States prior to the five year statutory period, are to be
considered in admitting or denying the petition.
7. Finally, several cases have been noted in which it was held that
a pardon-whether partial or absolute-does not remove the petitioner's offense from the pale of consideration for naturalization,
although it may exonerate him and remove his guilt from the legal
viewpoint.
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